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Summary. In this paper, we first give a direct proof of the existence of
Edgeworth equilibria for exchange economies with consumption sets which
are (possibly) unbounded below. The key assumption is that the individu-
ally rational utility set is compact. It is worth noticing that the statement
of this result and its proof do not depend on the dimension or the particular
structure of the commodity space. In a second part of the paper, we give
conditions under which Edgeworth allocations can be decentralized by con-
tinuous prices in a finite dimensional and in an infinite dimensional setting.
We then show how these results apply to some finance models.
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1 Introduction
Since Hart (1974) [18], one knows that the existence of equilibrium in ex-
change economies with unbounded below consumption sets requires some
nonarbitrage condition. For exchange economies consisting of a finite num-
ber of agents and defined on a finite dimensional commodity space, different
variants of such a condition and different concepts of arbitrage have been
formulated in [23], [24], [25], [27], [33]. The relations between these condi-
tions are studied in [4], [12], [27]. All in turn imply the compactness of the
individually rational utility set1 when the preferences of agents are derived
from utility functions. The few papers dealing with the equilibrium existence
in an infinite dimensional setting ([9], [10], [11], [13]) assume the compact-
ness of this set. Cheng [10], Chichilnisky and Heal [11], Dana et al. [13] give
also sufficient conditions on the primitives of the economy for this condi-
tion to be fulfilled. It is worth noticing that this compactness assumption
in the utility space is strictly weaker than any compactness assumption in
the allocation space.
This nonarbitrage condition is the central assumption of this paper. In
order to model asset markets, we consider an exchange economy consist-
ing of m agents, defined on a vector commodity space. Each agent is given
with a (possibly unbounded below) consumption set, a utility function rep-
resenting his preferences on his consumption set, an initial endowment. Our
first concern is a direct proof for such models of the existence of Edgeworth
equilibria as classically defined by Aliprantis–Brown–Burkinshaw [1]. Since
the set of attainable allocations needs not be bounded, this existence can-
not be deduced from Debreu and Scarf’s theorem [14] or its extensions to
an infinite dimensional setting ([1] and [16]). However, given the nonarbi-
trage condition, this existence is guaranteed under mild assumptions stated
independently of the dimension of the commodity space or its particular
structure.
The proof of this result is based on an extension to fuzzy coalitions
of Scarf’s theorem on the nonemptiness of the core of a nontransferable
utility game. The arguments of this preliminary result are inspired by a
nice paper of Vohra [32] (see also [30]). The notion of balancedness for such
a fuzzy game is borrowed from Florenzano [16]. The preliminary result is
then applied to a proof (for any integer r) of the nonemptiness of the core
of a fuzzy game appropriately associated to the r-replica of the exchange
model. Finally, the existence of Edgeworth equilibria is proved using the
compactness of the individually rational utility set.
A direct proof of the existence of Edgeworth equilibria opens a room
for using core-equilibrium equivalence theorems for proving the existence of
1 As defined below, the individually rational utility set, sometimes simply called
Utility set, is the set of utility vectors in which every agent receives no less than the
utility of his initial endowment and no more than the utility of his consumption
in some attainable allocation.
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Walras equilibria. The second part of the paper is devoted to some core-
equilibrium equivalence theorems and to their consequences for the existence
of Walras equilibria in asset market models. Obviously, Edgeworth equilibria
exist if equilibrium exists. The philosophy of the converse way we offer in
this paper is to clearly separate the mild but central assumptions used in
the fixed-point based first argument from the peculiarities of the various
models of Finance to which this result can be applied when one looks at the
decentralization of Edgeworth allocations.
Recall that the purpose of a core-equilibrium equivalence theorem is
to show that Edgeworth allocations can be decentralized as quasiequilibria
with continuous prices. Unlike the Edgeworth equilibrium existence theo-
rem, the techniques for obtaining the decentralizing continuous prices differ
very much according to the dimension and the structure of the commodity
(portfolio) space. In the finite dimensional case, the decentralizing vector
price is obtained as a tangent linear functional supporting at the origin the
set co(
⋃
i Γi), where Γi is the set of preferred net trades of the ith con-
sumer. The same argument works in an infinite dimensional setting if the
properties of preferred sets allow to use Hahn-Banach’s theorem, that is
under an interiority assumption. Moreover, it is also under an interiority
assumption that the quasi-equilibrium obtained in this way is nontrivial,
hence is a good candidate for equilibrium. Without interiority properties,
we assume a vector lattice commodity space with a lattice ordered price
space and propose several core-equilibrium equivalence results established
using properness assumptions on the preferences of the agents. In all cases,
adding the assumptions of the core-equilibrium equivalence theorem to the
assumptions of the Edgeworth equilibrium existence result allows to extend
most of known Walras equilibrium existence results for financial markets.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we prove the prelimi-
nary result. Section 3 contains the main result of the paper, the Edgeworth
equilibrium existence result for an economy with (possibly) unbounded be-
low consumption sets. Section 4 is devoted to decentralization results and to
their consequences for the existence of Walras equilibria. Section 5 indicates
how these results apply to some known models of Finance.
2 A preliminary nonemptiness theorem for the core of a fuzzy
game
Let M = {1, . . . ,m} be a finite set of players and T = [0, 1]m \ {0}. An
element t ∈ T is interpreted as a fuzzy coalition, that is, a vector t = (ti)
m
i=1
of rates of participation to the coalition t for the different players.
We consider in this section m-person fuzzy games defined by (T , V )
where T is a finite subset of T containing 1¯ = (1, . . . , 1) and the canonical
base (ei) of Rm and V : T → Rm is a nonempty-valued correspondence.
For a fuzzy coalition t ∈ T , let us denote
supp t = {i ∈M | ti > 0}
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the set of agents who participate in this coalition.
Definition 2.1 The fuzzy core of the m-person fuzzy game (T , V ) is the set
C(T , V ) = {v ∈ V (1¯) |6 ∃t ∈ T and u ∈ V (t) s.t. vi < ui, ∀i ∈ supp t}.
Consider the following set
∆T = {λ = (λt)t∈T | λt ≥ 0 and
∑
t∈T
λtt = 1¯}.
It is easily seen that ∆T is nonempty.
Definition 2.2 A m-person fuzzy game (T , V ) is said to be balanced when-
ever for every λ ∈ ∆T , ⋂
{t∈T |λt>0}
V (t) ⊂ V (1¯).
The following theorem extends Scarf’s theorem [29] as stated by Aliprantis–
Brown–Burkinshaw [1]. Some ideas of the proof are due to R. Vohra [32]
(see also Shapley and Vohra [30]). This section is devoted to its proof.
Theorem 2.1 If T is as above and if (T , V ) is a balanced m-person fuzzy
game such that
a) each V (t) is closed,
b) each V (t) is comprehensive from below, i.e., u ≤ v and v ∈ V (t) imply
u ∈ V (t),
c) u ∈ Rm, v ∈ V (t) and ui = vi ∀i ∈ supp t imply u ∈ V (t),
d) for each t ∈ T there exists ct ∈ R, such that v ∈ V (t) implies vi ≤ ct
for all i ∈ supp t,
then
C(T , V ) 6= ∅.
Proof. Each V (t) is comprehensive from below. So for each t ∈ T , there
exists at ∈ R
m such that 0 ∈ int(at + V (t)). If a = ∨t∈T at, it is obvious
that a + V satisfies the properties a), b), c), d) and that C(T , a + V ) =
a+ C(T , V ). Hence, without loss of generality, we can (and we will) assume
that 0 ∈ intV (t) for each t ∈ T .
Next, fix some constant c > 0 such that for each t ∈ T and each v ∈ V (t)
we have vi < c for all i ∈ supp t, and then consider the set
W =
( ⋃
t∈T
V (t)
) ⋂(
]−∞, c]m
)
.
Clearly, the set W is closed, comprehensive from below and contains 0 in
its interior. Let ∂W denote the boundary of W .
Claim 2.1. If v ∈ ∂W ∩ Rm+ and vi = 0 for some i, then vj = c holds for
some j.
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Proof of Claim 2.1. To see this, assume that vi = 0 and vj < c holds for
each j. Since 0 ∈ intV (ei), there exists some u ∈ V (ei) with 0 < ui < c.
From Property c), we see that the vector x defined by xj = c for j 6= i and
xi = ui belongs to V (e
i) (and hence to W ∩Rm+ ) and satisfies v ≪ x. This
implies v ∈ intW , a contradiction.
Let ∆ be the unit-simplex of Rm.
Claim 2.2. For each s ∈ ∆, there exists a unique α > 0 (depending on s)
such that αs ∈ ∂W ∩Rm+ .
Proof of Claim 2.2. Let s ∈ ∆. We first prove that there exists at most
one α such that αs ∈ ∂W ∩ Rm+ . Indeed, let αs and βs be elements of
∂W ∩ Rm+ such that α > β > 0. If si > 0 holds for each i, then αsi > βsi
holds for each i and so βs is an interior point of W , a contradiction. On
the other hand, if si = 0 holds for some i, then by Claim 2.1 there exists
some j such that βsj = c and so that αsj > c, a contradiction. Moreover,
let α = sup{β | βs ∈ W ∩ Rm+ }. From 0 ∈ intW , we deduce that α > 0.
From the definition of W , we deduce that α is finite. Since, W is closed it
follows that αs ∈ ∂W ∩Rm+ .
Thus, a function f : ∆ −→ ∂W ∩Rm+ can be defined by formula
f(s) = αs where α = sup{β ∈ R+ | βs ∈W ∩R
m
+ }.
Claim 2.3. f is continuous.
Proof of Claim 2.3. It suffices to show that f has a closed graph. Let us
consider a sequence (sn, f(sn)) in ∆× (∂W ∩Rm+ ) that converges to (s, y).
Write f(sn) = αnsn ∈ ∂W ∩Rm+ . Then α
n = ‖αnsn‖1 = ‖f(s
n)‖1 −→ ‖y‖1,
and hence f(sn) = αnsn −→ ‖y‖1s. By uniqueness of the limit y = ‖y‖1s.
Since ∂W ∩ Rm+ is a closed set, it follows from Claim 2.2 that f(s) = y.
Consequently, f has a closed graph.
Define a correspondence Ψ : ∆→ ∆ by
Ψ(s) =
{
t
‖t‖1
| t ∈ T and f(s) ∈ V (t)
}
Claim 2.4. Ψ is nonempty-valued and has a closed graph.
Proof of Claim 2.4. Since f(s) ∈ W , it follows immediately that Ψ(s) is
a nonempty subset of ∆. Furthermore, let us assume sn → s, yn → y
and yn ∈ Ψ(sn). Since the range of Ψ is a finite set, there exists some n0
such that for all n ≥ n0, y
n = y and f(sn) ∈
⋃
{t∈T | t
‖t‖1
=y} V (t). Since
{t ∈ T | t‖t‖1 = y} is a finite set, passing to a subsequence if necessary, we
can assume that f(sn) ∈ V (t0) for some t0 ∈ {t ∈ T |
t
‖t‖1
= y}. Since f
is continuous and V (t0) is a closed set, we deduce that f(s) ∈ V (t0) and
consequently y ∈ Ψ(s).
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Now we define the function g : ∆×∆→ ∆ by
gi(s, µ) =
si + (µi −
1
m
)+
1 +
∑m
j=1(µj −
1
m
)+
where, as usual, r+ = max{r, 0} for each real number r.
Clearly, g is a continuous function. Finally, we consider the correspondence
Φ : ∆×∆→ ∆×∆ defined by
Φ(s, µ) = {g(s, µ)} × coΨ(s).
Note that Φ is nonempty and convex-valued and has a closed graph. Thus
by Kakutani’s fixed point theorem, Φ has a fixed point (s¯, µ¯). That is,
s¯ = g(s¯, µ¯) and µ¯ ∈ coΨ(s¯).
In other words,
s¯i =
s¯i + (µ¯i −
1
m
)+
1 +
∑m
j=1(µ¯j −
1
m
)+
, i ∈M (2.1)
and there exist T ′ ⊂ T , (at)t∈T ′ ∈ R
T ′ , with at > 0 for each t ∈ T
′ and∑
t∈T ′ at = 1, such that
µ¯ =
∑
t∈T ′
at
t
‖t‖1
, f(s¯) ∈ V (t) ∀t ∈ T ′ (2.2)
Claim 2.5. For all i ∈M , µ¯i =
1
m
.
Proof of Claim 2.5. Suppose that it is not true. Recalling that µ¯ ∈ ∆, it
follows from (2.1) that
∑m
j=1(µ¯j −
1
m
)+ > 0 Then, the sets
I = {i ∈M | s¯i > 0} = {i ∈M | µ¯i >
1
m
}
and
J = {i ∈M | s¯i = 0} = {i ∈M | µ¯i ≤
1
m
}
are both nonempty. Indeed, from
∑m
i=1(µ¯i −
1
m
)+ > 0, it follows that (µ¯i −
1
m
)+ > 0 for some i. On the other hand, if µ¯i >
1
m
for each i, then
∑m
i=1 µ¯i >
1, a contradiction. Clearly, for all j ∈ J we have sj = 0 hence f(s)j = 0.
From (2.2), for all i ∈ I, there exists t ∈ T ′ such that ti > 0, f(s¯) ∈ V (t),
hence f(s¯)i < c, which, together with J 6= ∅, contradicts Claim 2.1.
Now, let us consider λ ∈ RT such that
λt =
{
mat
‖t‖1
if t ∈ T ′,
0 otherwise.
Clearly
∑
t∈T λtt = 1¯, and therefore λ ∈ ∆
T .
Claim 2.6. f(s¯) ∈ C(T , V )
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Proof of Claim 2.6. Since λ ∈ ∆T we have⋂
t∈T ′
V (t) =
⋂
{t∈T |λt>0}
V (t) ⊂ V (1¯).
Hence f(s¯) ∈ V (1¯). Suppose that there exists t ∈ T and v ∈ V (t) such that
f(s¯)i < vi for all i ∈ supp t. Let u be such that ui = vi for all i ∈ supp t
and ui = c otherwise. It follows from Property c) that u ∈ V (t) ⊂ W .
But f(s¯) ≪ u contradicts the fact that f(s¯) ∈ ∂W ∩Rm+ . Therefore f(s¯) ∈
C(T , V ), which ends the proof of theorem 2.1.
3 Application to the existence of Edgeworth equilibria of an
arbitrage-free exchange economy
3.1 Definitions
In order to apply the previous theorem, we consider an exchange econ-
omy defined on a commodity vector space L and recall some definitions.
M = {1, . . . ,m} is the set of consumers. Each consumer i is described by a
consumption set Xi ⊂ L, an initial endowment ei ∈ Xi, and a preference re-
lation which is represented by a utility function ui : Xi → R. We normalize
the utility functions by requiring ui(ei) = 0. To summarize, the economy E
is a collection
E =
(
(Xi, ui, ei)i∈M
)
.
Let A(E) be the set of all attainable allocations of the economy E , that
is:
A(E) = {x = (xi)i∈M ∈
∏
i∈M
Xi |
∑
i∈M
xi =
∑
i∈M
ei}.
Let also M = 2M \ {∅} be the family of all coalitions of consumers. The
allocation x ∈ A(E) is improved upon by the coalition S ∈ M if there
exists (x′i)i∈S ∈
∏
i∈S Xi satisfying
∑
i∈S x
′
i =
∑
i∈S ei and such that
ui(xi) < ui(x
′
i) for every i ∈ S. The core of the economy E , denoted by
C(E), is defined as the set of all allocations x ∈ A(E) which are improved
upon by no coalition. Finally, following Aliprantis–Brown–Burkinshaw [1],
x ∈ A(E) is said to be an Edgeworth equilibrium if, for every integer r ≥ 1,
the r-repetition of x belongs to the core of the r-fold replica of E . We will
denote by CE(E) the set of all Edgeworth equilibria of E .
For each integer r ≥ 1, using the notations of the previous section, if
T r = {t ∈ T | rti ∈ {0, . . . , r}, ∀i ∈M},
let us define Cr(E) as the set of all attainable allocations x ∈ A(E) such
that there exist no t ∈ T r and no xt ∈
∏
i∈supp tXi such that∑
i∈supp t
tix
t
i =
∑
i∈supp t
tiei and ∀i ∈ supp t, ui(xi) < ui(x
t
i).
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As it is easily seen and proved in Florenzano [16], under convexity assump-
tions on preferences and consumption sets, CE(E) =
⋂
r≥1 C
r(E). In other
words, CE(E) is the set of all x ∈ A(E) such that there exist no t = (ti)i∈M ∈
T , with rational rates of participation, and no xt ∈
∏
i∈supp tXi such that∑
i∈supp t
tix
t
i =
∑
i∈supp t
tiei and ∀i ∈ supp t, ui(xi) < ui(x
t
i).
Following Aubin [8], the fuzzy core of the economy E , CF (E), is the set of all
x ∈ A(E) such that there exist no t = (ti)i∈M ∈ T and no x
t ∈
∏
i∈supp tXi
such that ∑
i∈supp t
tix
t
i =
∑
i∈supp t
tiei and ∀i ∈ supp t, ui(xi) < ui(x
t
i).
3.2 The existence result
Let us now denote by
U = {v = (vi)
m
i=1 ∈ R
m
+ | ∃x ∈ A(E), s.t. 0 ≤ vi ≤ ui(xi), ∀i ∈M}
the individually rational utility set2. Set also
A = {x = (xi)
m
i=1 ∈ A(E) | ui(xi) ≥ 0, ∀i ∈M}.
We make on E the following assumptions:
[A.1] For each i, Xi is convex (with ei ∈ Xi);
[A.2] For each i, ui : Xi → R is quasi-concave;
[A.3] U is compact.
For a fuzzy coalition t ∈ T r, let
At(E) = {xt ∈
∏
i∈supp t
Xi |
∑
i∈supp t
tix
t
i =
∑
i∈supp t
tiei}
and
U t = {vt ∈ Rsupp t+ | ∃x
t ∈ At(E), s.t. 0 ≤ vi ≤ ui(x
t
i), ∀i ∈ supp t}.
Finally, let
V (t) = (U t −Rsupp t+ )×R
M\supp t,
where (U t −Rsupp t+ ) denotes the closure of (U
t −Rsupp t+ ).
Proposition 3.1 Assume [A.1]–[A.3]. Then C(T r, V ) is a nonempty subset
of U .
2 Recall that ui(ei) = 0, i = 1, . . . , m.
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Proof. Since U is compact, there exists c > 0 such that U ⊂]−∞, c[m. For
each t ∈ T r, let us define
V c(t) =
(
(U t −Rsupp t+ )
⋂
( ]−∞, c])supp t
)
×RM\supp t
We will keep in mind that V c(1¯) = V (1¯) = U − Rm+ and that for every i,
V c(ei) = V (ei) = −R+ × R
M\{i}. We first claim that the m-person fuzzy
game (T r, V c) has a nonempty fuzzy core, that is, C(T r, V c) 6= ∅.
Clearly, T r is a finite subset of T containing 1¯ = (1, . . . , 1) and the canonical
base (ei) of Rm. The properties listed in Theorem 2.1 are also trivially satis-
fied. It suffices to verify that the m-person fuzzy game (T r, V c) is balanced
in the sense of Definition 2.2.
To this end, let λ ∈ ∆T
r
and v ∈
⋂
{t∈T r|λt>0}
V c(t). For each integer n
and for every t ∈ T r such that λt > 0, there exists x
n,t ∈ At(E) such that
ui(x
n,t
i ) ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ supp t and
vi ≤ ui(x
n,t
i ) +
1
n
, ∀i ∈ supp t. (3.1)
For each i ∈M , let
xni =
∑
t∈T r
λttix
n,t
i .
Since
∑
t∈T r λtt = 1¯, we have for each i ∈M , x
n
i ∈ Xi (Xi is convex) and
m∑
i=1
xni =
m∑
i=1
∑
t∈T r
λttix
n,t
i =
∑
t∈T r
λt(
∑
i∈supp t
tix
n,t
i )
=
∑
t∈T r
λt(
∑
i∈M
tiei) =
m∑
i=1
(
∑
t∈T r
λtti)ei =
m∑
i=1
ei,
which shows that xn ∈ A(E). Now, from relations (3.1) and in view of the
definition of xn and the quasi-concavity of utility functions ui, we have
vi ≤ ui(x
n
i ) +
1
n
, ∀i ∈M.
Since for every t ∈ T r such that λt > 0, ui(x
n,t
i ) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ supp t, we have
also
(
ui(x
n
i )
)
i∈M
∈ U . Passing to a subsequence if necessary, it follows from
the compactness of U that there exists x ∈ A(E) such that
vi ≤ lim
n→+∞
ui(x
n
i ) ≤ ui(xi), ∀i ∈M.
Hence v ∈ V (1¯) = V c(1¯), which shows that the game (T r, V c) is balanced.
It then follows from Theorem 2.1 that C(T r, V c) 6= ∅.
To end the proof, let v ∈ C(T r, V c). Note that v ∈ V c(1¯) = V (1¯) =
U −Rm+ . Moreover, v ∈ U . Indeed if not, for some i, {0} × R
M\{i} ∈ V (ei)
with 0 > vi. We now prove by contraposition that v ∈ C(T
r, V ). Let us
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assume on the contrary that there exist t ∈ T r and u ∈ V (t) such that
vi < ui ∀i ∈ supp t. Since vi < c ∀i ∈M , one can find λ ∈]0, 1[ such that
vi < λvi + (1− λ)ui < min{c, ui} ∀i ∈ supp t.
Hence
(
λvi + (1− λ)ui
)
i∈supp t
∈ V c(t). We have got a contradiction.
Proposition 3.2 Assume [A.1]–[A.3] on E. Then
⋂
r≥1 C(T
r, V ) 6= ∅.
Proof. First, we show that C(T r, V ) is closed. Let v = limn→+∞ v
n with
vn ∈ C(T r, V ). Suppose that v 6∈ C(T r, V ). Then there exists t ∈ T r and
u ∈ V (t) such that vi < ui ∀i ∈ supp t. But, for n large enough, we have
vni < ui ∀i ∈ supp t, a contradiction. To end the proof, in view of the
compactness of U , it suffices to show that for each integer r ≥ 1 we have
C(T r+1, V ) ⊂ C(T r, V ). Let v ∈ C(T r+1, V ) and suppose that v /∈ C(T r, V ).
Then there exists t ∈ T r and u ∈ V (t) such that vi < ui ∀i ∈ supp t. Let us
consider t′ = r
r+1
t. Clearly At
′
(E) = At(E), U t = U t
′
, V (t) = V (t′). Since
t′ ∈ T r+1 and u ∈ V (t′), we have got a contradiction.
We are now ready to prove the main result of this section.
Theorem 3.1 Under Assumptions [A.1]–[A.3], the set of Edgeworth equi-
libria CE(E) is nonempty.
Proof. Let v ∈
⋂
r≥1 C(T
r, V ) and x ∈ A(E) be such that vi ≤ ui(xi) ∀i ∈
M . We claim that x ∈ CE(E). Indeed, if for some r, x /∈ Cr(E), then there
exist t ∈ T r and x′ ∈ At(E) such that vi ≤ ui(xi) < ui(x
′
i) for all i ∈ supp t.
Hence v /∈ C(T r, V ), a contradiction.
Remark 3.1 Adding the assumption that the commodity space is finite di-
mensional, the consumption sets are closed and the utility functions are
upper semicontinuous at every attainable consumption vector to the other
assumptions of Theorem 3.1, it would be easy to deduce its conclusion from
Proposition 3 in Florenzano [16]. Under analogous topological assumptions
(relative to the weak∗-topology on L), the same proof3 can be given if the
commodity space is an infinite dimensional Banach space which has a Ba-
nach predual. These two cases cover most of commodity spaces of economic
interest. However, it should be noticed that the statement of Theorem 3.1
and its proof do not depend on the dimension of the commodity space or
on its particular structure.
3 Truncating the economy by an increasing sequence of closed balls of L, cen-
tered at 0 and containing all initial endowments, one obtains a sequence (xνi )
m
i=1
of Edgeworth equilibria of the truncated economies. The sequence (ui(x
ν
i ))
m
i=1 be-
longs to U and has a converging subsequence. At the limit, from the definition of
U , one gets an allocation (xi)
m
i=1. Using the upper semicontinuity of functions ui,
it is easily proved that this allocation is an Edgeworth equilibrium of E .
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Remark 3.2 As proved in Cheng [10], Dana–Le Van–Magnien [12], Allouch
[4], in an infinite as well in a finite setting, Assumption [A.3] is strictly
weaker than assuming that the set A of attainable and individually rational
allocations is compact. It is even strictly weaker than assuming that every
attainable and individually rational allocation can be Pareto dominated by
an allocation belonging to some compact subset ofA (for details, see Allouch
[4]).
Remark 3.3 As easily seen and proved in Florenzano [16], if the commodity
space L is a Hausdorff topological vector space and if the utility functions
are lower semicontinuous at every attainable and individually rational con-
sumption vector, an Edgeworth equilibrium whose existence is proved in
Theorem 3.1 is actually an element of the fuzzy core, CF (E), of the economy
E . As it is easily verified, the same holds true without continuity condition
if Assumption [A.2] is replaced by:
[A′.2] For each i, ui : Xi → R is concave.
4 Walras equilibria of an arbitrage-free exchange economy
Recall that a couple (x, p) is said to be a quasiequilibrium of E if and only
if x ∈ A(E), p is a linear functional on L, with p 6= 0, and for every i ∈M ,
p · xi = p · ei and ui(x
′
i) > ui(xi) ⇒ p · x
′
i ≥ p · xi.
This quasiequilibrium is said to be nontrivial if for some i ∈M ,
inf
x′
i
∈Xi
p · x′i < p · ei.
A quasiequilibrium (x, p) is a Walras equilibrium if ui(x
′
i) > ui(xi) actually
implies p · x′i > p · xi.
If for every i ∈M , infx′
i
∈Xi p ·x
′
i < p · ei and if each ui:Xi → IR either is
a concave function or is lower semicontinuous at xi, then a quasiequilibrium
(x, p) is actually an equilibrium. Under some irreducubility assumption on
the economy, the same holds true if (x, p) is a nontrivial quasiequilibrium.
For this reason, in the following, we will be interested only in nontrivial
quasiequilibria and will prove the existence of nontrivial quasiequilibria by
decentralizing Edgeworth equilibria obtained via Theorem 3.1.
4.1 Decentralization under interiority assumptions
Let us first assume that the commodity space L is Rℓ, the ℓ-dimensional
Euclidean space. For each xi ∈ Xi, we define the strictly preferred set to xi
by
Pi(xi) = {x
′
i ∈ Xi | ui(xi) < ui(x
′
i)}
and we set the two following assumptions:
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[A.4] For each i ∈ M , ui is lower semicontinuous at every attainable and
individually rational consumption vector;
[A.5] If x ∈ A then for each i ∈M , xi ∈ Pi(xi) (the closure of Pi(xi)).
4
Proposition 4.1 Assume that the commodity space is finite dimensional.
Then under [A.1]–[A.5] (resp. [A.1], [A′.2], [A.3], [A.5]), the economy E =(
(Xi, ui, ei)i∈M ) has a quasiequilibrium. This quasiequilibrium is nontrivial
provided that e ∈ int
∑
i∈M Xi.
Proof. Let x¯ ∈ CE(E). In view of Assumption [A.4] (resp. [A’.2]), by Re-
mark 3.3 x¯ ∈ CF (E). Let G = co(
⋃
i∈M (Pi(x¯i) − {ei})). The set G is non-
empty since x¯ ∈ A and Assumption [A.5] imply that Pi(x¯i) 6= ∅. We first
prove that 0 /∈ G. Indeed if not, there exists λ = (λi)i∈M such that λi ≥ 0,
for all i and
∑
i∈M λi = 1 and (xi) ∈
∏
i∈M Xi such that∑
i∈M
λixi =
∑
i∈M
λiei
xi ∈ Pi(x¯i), ∀i such that λi > 0.
Thus the fuzzy coalition λ improves upon x¯, which contradicts x¯ ∈ CF (E).
Now, by the separation theorem for finite dimensional vector spaces,
there exists p ∈ Rℓ \ 0 such that p · g ≥ 0, for all g ∈ G. From [A.5],
one deduces that p · x¯i ≥ p · ei for all i ∈ M . Since x¯ ∈ C
E(E), one has∑
i∈M x¯i =
∑
i∈M ei. Thus p · x¯i = p · ei for all i ∈ M and (x¯, p) is a
quasi-equilibrium of E .
The proof of the last assertion is obvious.
Remark 4.1 In view of [A.4] (resp. [A′.2]), assuming either that each ei ∈
intXi or that E satisfies some irreducibility assumption, then the nontrivial
quasiequilibrium (x¯, p) is a Walras equilibrium.
Proposition 4.1 extends Nielsen [23], Page and Wooders [26], Dana–Le Van–
Magnien [12], in fact most of finite dimensional equilibrium existence results
established under no-arbitrage conditions which imply the compactness of
U , as far as one forgets for some of them (Hart [18], Page [24], Page and
Wooders [26]) the dependence on relative prices of consumption sets and
preferences. A notable exception is Werner [33] who uses a different nonsa-
tiation assumption. In [6], Allouch–Le Van–Page indicate how to modify the
economy in order to apply Proposition 4.1 to the modified economy, get-
ting then existence of quasiequilibrium in the original economy. Note that
4 As remarked by several authors, a nonsatiation assumption in every compo-
nent of an attainable allocation may be unreasonable (for example, if consumption
sets coincide with the consumption space, it implies nonsatiation for each agent
on the whole consumption space). We emphasize that we only assume here non-
satiation at every attainable and individually rational consumption vector.
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Nielsen, Dana–Le Van–Magnien assume neither [A.4] nor [A′.2]5 but prove
only the existence of a quasiequilibrium.
Let us now assume that the commodity space, L, is an infinite di-
mensional Hausdorff topological vector space and that for every x ∈ A,
int(
⋃
i∈M (Pi(xi)−{ei})) 6= ∅. Using Hahn-Banach’s theorem, we can mimic
the proof of Proposition 4.1 in order to obtain:
Proposition 4.2 If L is a Hausdorff topological vector space, assume [A.1]–
[A.5] (resp. [A.1], [A′.2], [A.3], [A.5]). If int(
⋃
i∈M (Pi(xi)−{ei})) 6= ∅ holds
for every attainable and individually rational allocation x, then the econ-
omy E =
(
(Xi, ui, ei)i∈M ) has a quasiequilibrium with continuous price.
This quasiequilibrium is nontrivial if e ∈ int
∑
i∈M Xi. Under the same ad-
ditional assumptions as in Remark 4.1, this nontrivial quasiequilibrium is
an equilibrium.
The previous result extends results of Cheng [10], Theorem 1 of Brown
and Werner [9], Theorem 1 of Ishimoto [19], Theorem 1 of Dana–Le Van–
Magnien [13]. As in the finite dimensional case, Dana–Le Van–Magnien
assume neither [A.4] nor [A’.2] but prove only the existence of a quasiequi-
librium. Assumptions [A.4] or [A’.2] would be of use for going from the
obtained quasiequilibrium to equilibrium.
4.2 Decentralization under properness assumptions
To go further, from now on we make the following structural assumption on
the commodity space:
[SA] L is a linear vector lattice (or Riesz space) endowed with a Hausdorff
linear topology τ such that
(i) L+ is a closed cone in the τ -topology of L;
(ii) L′ is a sublattice of the order dual of L.
As well-known, [SA] holds true if L is a topological vector lattice but may
be satisfied in other settings.
Under this assumption, different properness assumptions compensate
the fact that consumption sets (hence preferred sets) may have empty inte-
rior or simply that e /∈ int
∑
i∈M Xi. The first two definitions below corre-
spond to the case where the consumption sets of the agents are equal to the
positive cone (∀i ∈ I, Xi = L+). Recall that e =
∑
i∈M ei and that for each
i, Pi(xi) = {x
′
i ∈ Xi | ui(xi) < ui(x
′
i)} defines a preference correspondence
(preference relation) Pi : Xi → Xi.
5 Due to their method of proof, they assume upper semicontinuity instead of
lower semicontinuity of utility functions. The need for openess of preferred sets in
consumption sets (or some substitute to this continuity property) is a drawback
of the Edgeworth equilibrium approach to the Walras quasiequilibrium existence.
Nevertheless such assumptions will be of use to go from the obtained quasiequi-
librium to equilibrium.
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Definition 4.1 (Yannelis – Zame[34]) The correspondence Pi is F -proper
at xi ∈ L+ if there exists some vxi ∈ L, some τ -open 0-neighborhood Vxi
and for each u ∈ Vxi , a real number λu > 0 such that if u ∈ V and if
0 < λ < λu, then xi + λ(vxi − u) ∈ Pi(xi), provided xi + λ(vxi − u) ∈ L+.
Definition 4.2 (Podczeck[28]) Let K be a linear subspace of L. The cor-
respondence Pi is E-proper relative to K at xi ∈ K+ if there exists some
vxi ∈ L+, some τ -open 0-neighborhood Vxi and some subset Axi ∈ L which
is radial at xi such that
(a) xi + αvxi ∈ Pi(xi) for every sufficiently small real number α > 0;
(b) (Pi(x) + Γxi) ∩K+ ∩Axi ⊂ Pi(xi), where Γxi is the open cone
Γxi = {λ(vxi − u) | 0 < λ, u ∈ Vxi}.
As proved by Podczeck [28], for preferences defined by utility functions,
uniform properness (as defined by Mas-Colell [22]) with a properness vector
in K implies E-properness relative to K.
The two following definitions correspond to the case of general consumption
sets.
Definition 4.3 (Tourky [31]) A preference relation Pi is M -proper at
xi ∈ Pi(xi) if there exist a convex lattice Zxi and a convex set
̂Pi(xi) such
that:
1. ̂Pi(xi) ⋂Zxi = Pi(xi);
2. xi + e is an interior point of ̂Pi(xi) and Pi(xi) is open in Zxi ;
3. 0, ei ∈ Zxi and Zxi + L+ = Zxi ;
4. (1 + α)xi ∈ Zxi for some α > 0.
Definition 4.4 (Florenzano – Marakulin [17]) Let K be some order
ideal of L containing e. The preference relation Pi is M -proper relative to
K at xi ∈ K∩Pi(xi) if there exist a convex sublattice Zxi of K and a convex
set ̂Pi(xi) such that:
1. ̂Pi(xi) ⋂(Zxi + L+) = Pi(xi);
2. xi + e is an interior point of ̂Pi(xi);
3. 0, ei ∈ Zxi and Zxi +K+ ⊂ Zxi ;
4. xi ∈ Zxi .
As proved in Podczeck [28], if L is locally convex and if for every i, Xi =
Zxi = L+, then M -properness at xi ∈ clPi(xi), as in Definition 4.3, implies
E-properness relative to L with e as properness vector, while M -properness
relative to K in Definition 4.4 implies E-properness relative to K with e as
properness vector.
In case of consumption sets equal to the positive cone, using Proposition
4.2 of Deghdak and Florenzano [15], we have the following existence result
where L(e) denotes the principal order ideal generated by e.
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Proposition 4.3 Assume [SA], [A.1] – [A.4] (resp. [SA], [A.1], [A′.2], [A.3])
and that
- either L(e) is τ -dense in L and each Pi is F -proper at every component
xi of an attainable and individually rational allocation, with a properness
vector satisfying xi + vxi ∈ L(e)+ and a convex properness 0-neighborhood
Vxi ;
- or each Pi is E-proper relative to L(e) at every component xi of an
attainable and individually rational allocation, with a properness vector sat-
isfying xi + vxi ∈ L(e)+ and a convex properness 0-neighborhood Vxi .
Then the economy E =
(
(Xi, ui, ei)i∈M ) has a nontrivial quasiequilibrium
with continuous price.
It is worth noticing that Assumption [A.5] is not needed in the previous
proposition since local nonsatiation at each component of x ∈ A follows
from the properness assumption.
Remark 4.2 In view of [A.4] (resp. [A’.2]), assuming either that for each i ∈
M , infx′
i
∈Xi p · x
′
i < p · ei or that E satisfies some irreducibility assumption,
then the nontrivial quasiequilibrium (x¯, p) is a Walras equilibrium.
With general consumption sets, we obtain the following existence results.
Notice that in the second one we do not assume monotonicity of preferences.
Proposition 4.4 Assume [SA], [A.1]–[A.3] and that, in addition, e > 0,
each ui is strictly increasing, each Pi is M -proper at every component of an
attainable and individually rational allocation. Then E has a quasiequilib-
rium (x¯, p) with p ∈ L′ such that p·e > 0. This quasiequilibrium is nontrivial
if for each i ∈ M , 0 ∈ Xi. Under [A.4] (resp. [A
′.2]) and the same addi-
tional assumptions as in Remark 4.2, the nontrivial quasiequilibrium is an
equilibrium.
Proof. By Theorem 3.1, Edgeworth equilibria exist for the economy. Then
the conclusion is immediate from Theorem 2.1 of Tourky [31].
Proposition 4.5 For each attainable and individually rational allocation
x = (xi)i∈I ∈ A, let L(u(x)) be the principal order ideal generated by all
xi, ei for i ∈ M . Assume [SA], [A.1]-[A.4] (resp. [SA], [A.1], [A
′.2], [A. 3]-
[A.4]) and that, in addition, e > 0, each Pi is M -proper relative to L(u(x))
at every component of an attainable and individually rational allocation.
Then E has a quasiequilibrium (x¯, p) with p ∈ L′ such that p · e > 0. This
quasiequilibrium is nontrivial if for each i ∈ M , 0 ∈ Xi. Under the same
additional assumptions as in Remark 4.2, the nontrivial quasiequilibrium is
an equilibrium.
Proof. By Theorem 3.1 and Remark 3.3, the fuzzy core of this economy is
nonempty. Then the conclusion is immediate from Corollary 4.1 of Floren-
zano–Marakulin [17].
Proposition 4.3 is a variant of Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 in Dana–Le
Van–Magnien [13]. Actually, both results go to Mas-Colell [22], Araujo and
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Monteiro [7] if one assumes monotonicity of preferences, and to Podczeck
[28] without monotonicity. Propositions 4.4 and 4.5 have no antecedent in
the literature on trade in financial assets.
5 Application to Finance
We now indicate how the results of the previous section can be used in
some examples of financial markets found in the literature. Let us consider
a finance model with m investors trading securities and having identical ex-
pectations on the security payoffs. In what follows, L denotes the portfolio
(vector) space. The space of contingent claims, E, is a space of real-valued
random variables on some underlying probability space (Ω,Σ, P ), such as
Lp(Ω,Σ, P ) for 1 ≤ p ≤ ∞. Let R : L → E be a one-to-one linear op-
erator defining the payoff of a portfolio x ∈ L, and M := R(L) be the
marketed contingent claim space. Each investor i is given a portfolio set
Xi ⊂ L and an initial endowment ei ∈ Xi. If agent i has a preference over
E described by the utility function vi : E → [−∞,+∞), we define the
portfolio utility function of i, ui : Xi → R, as the indirect utility function
given by ui(xi) = vi(R(xi)). The economy under consideration is either
(Xi, ui, ei)
m
i=1 or (R(Xi), vi, R(ei))
m
i=1.
The finite dimensional case (dimL <∞, hence dimM <∞) has its own
interest as an idealization of Hart’s model. It is also useful in the equilibrium
versions of the Arbitrage Pricing Theory and the Capital Asset Pricing
Model, though their formulation involve an infinite dimensional portfolio
space. Specifically, let us assume as Kim [20] that E = L2(Ω,Σ, P ), M
is norm-closed, each individual portfolio set is equal to L, each investor i
has a strictly concave von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility function vi, and
the economy has a finite dimensional factor subspace F , containing the
payoff of the total initial endowment, the riskless payoff, and such that every
marketed contingent claim in M is second-order stochastically dominated by
an element of F . As observed by Kim [20], the equilibrium existence problem
in the infinite dimensional economy
(
M, vi, R(ei)
)m
i=1
is then reduced to
the equilibrium existence problem in an economy appropriately defined on
the finite dimensional commodity space F . This reduction works in the
equilibrium versions of the Arbitrage Pricing Theory as well as the Capital
Asset Pricing Model, and provides an equilibrium existence result, as far as
the assumptions made on the initial model (essentially the existence of a
riskless marketed payoff and assumptions implying the compactness of U)
allow to apply Proposition 4.1 to the associated finite dimensional economy.
The CAPM can also be directly studied as an infinite dimensional model
where the existence of a quasiequilibrium follows from Proposition 4.2. In
[13], Dana–Le Van–Magnien work directly in the space M of marketed
contingent claims, a norm-closed subspace of E = L2(Ω,Σ, P ). For each
i, Xi = M is the portfolio set of i, ei ∈ M , vi : L2(Ω,Σ, P ) → R is
“mean variance”, in other words there exists a strictly concave function,
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Ui : IR× [−ρ,+∞[→ IR, increasing in its first variable and strictly decreas-
ing in the second one, such that vi(xi) = Ui
(
E(xi), var(xi)
)
, xi ∈ Xi, where
E(xi) and var(xi) denote the expectation and variance of xi. One will find
in [13], under two alternative sets of assumptions, a complete checking of
the conditions of Proposition 4.2 for the model
(
M, vi, R(ei)
)m
i=1
, especially
of the interiority conditions. Note that the obtained equilibrium price is an
element of L2(Ω,Σ, P ), proved to belong in fact to a 2-dimensional subspace
of L2(Ω,Σ, P ).
Actually, most of equilibrium existence results for financial models with
infinite dimensional portfolio spaces or marketed contingent claim spaces
can be obtained using Proposition 4.2, that is under interiority conditions
which are postulated or verified. These conditions are easier to satisfy if, as
in Section 3 of [19], each Xi is equal to the whole space M , a norm-closed
subspace of E = Lp(Ω,Σ, P ) and each vi is a state-separable concave utility
function. An interesting example where individual portfolio sets differ from
the whole portfolio space is given in Section 6 of Brown–Werner [9]. In this
example, E = L∞(Ω,Σ, P ) is the space of contingent claims. There is a
countable collection of securities, one of them is the riskless asset R1(ω) = 1
for each ω ∈ Ω, and L = ℓ1 = {x ∈ R
∞ |
∑∞
k=1 | xk |< +∞} is the portfolio
space. As returns Rk, k = 1, 2, . . . ,+∞, are assumed to belong to a norm-
bounded subset of L+∞(Ω,Σ, P ), then R(x) =
∑∞
k=1 xkRk ∈ L∞(Ω,Σ, P )
is defined for each x ∈ L. Assuming that investors are constrained to have
non-negative end-of-period wealth, the portfolio set of each i ∈ M is Xi =
{x ∈ L | R(x) ≥ 0}, vi : L
+
∞(Ω,Σ, P ) → R
+ is a state-separable, concave,
continuous utility function, ei ∈ Xi. As the nonrisky asset belongs to the
norm-interior of Xi, the interiority condition of Proposition 4.2 is satisfied.
On the other hand, it follows from the definition of the portfolio sets that U
is bounded. If one assumes in addition that R(ℓ1) is a norm-closed subset of
L∞, that R is one-to-one and that vi is continuous for the Mackey topology
τ(L∞, L1) associated to the duality < L∞, L1 >, then it is easily seen that
U is closed. The other assumptions are easy to check. The existence of a
quasiequilibrium with a price in ℓ∞, follows from Proposition 4.2.
Since consumption sets of agents are assumed to be equal to the positive
cone, Proposition 4.3 may seem far from our main concern: the existence
of equilibrium in models with short selling. However, a reordering of the
portfolio space such that the portfolio sets of the agents become equal to the
positive cone arises naturally in financial models. For example, in Aliprantis
et al. [2], E = Lp(Ω,Σ, P ), 1 ≤ p ≤ +∞. As in Brown–Werner [9], there is
a countable collection of securities. The portfolio space is L = Φ, the space
of all eventually zero real sequences,
Φ = {x = (xn) ∈ IR
∞ | xn = 0 for all but a finite number of n}
endowed with the inductive limit topology. If investors are constrained to
have non-negative end-of-period wealth, then Xi = {x ∈ L | R(x) ≥ 0} is
the portfolio set of i, vi : L
+
p (Ω,Σ, P ) → R
+ is a state-separable, quasi-
concave, continuous utility function such that the contingent claim R(e) is
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desirable, ei ∈ Xi. If R is one-to-one, L can be ordered by the partial order
x ≥R x
′ ⇔ R(x) ≥ R(x′), so that each consumption set Xi is now equal to
the positive cone of (L,≥R). As in the previous paragraph, it follows from
the definition of the portfolio sets that U is bounded. Aliprantis et al. [2]
give a condition on the cone of positive payoff portfolios which implies that
U is closed. In the absence of an interiority condition, the existence of equi-
librium with a price in R∞ follows from a properness assumption with e as
properness vector. Properness of ui in (L,≥R)
+ is inherited from properness
of vi in L
+
p (Ω,Σ, P ). Conditions on the properties of vi, which guarantee
this properness, can be found in Le Van [21]. In order to apply Proposition
4.3, it remains to verify the structural assumption [SA], guaranteed in this
model by the hypothesis made on the positive cone of (L,≥R). Note that
in other models, it may be hard to verify that, ordered by the the portfolio
dominance, the portfolio space is a Riesz space. However, this verification
is indispensable. Aliprantis–Monteiro–Tourky [3] give an example of an ex-
change economy with proper preferences on a positive cone defined on IR3
which satisfies the assumptions of Proposition 4.3 but does not admit any
nontrivial equilibrium.
When the investors are not constrained to have non negative end-of-
period wealth, but have consumption sets which may differ from the whole
portfolio set, an interiority condition may stay difficult to satisfy. In order to
use Propositions 4.4 or 4.5 for obtaining an equilibrium existence result in an
expected utility financial model, it remains to characterize M -properness in
a framework a` la Aliprantis et al. [2] (where after reordering of the portfolio
space, the preferences of the agents are strictly monotone) or M -properness
relative to L(u(x)) (as in Proposition 4.5) in a framework a` la Brown-
Werner [9] (where preferences cannot be assumed to be monotone). Such a
characterization is left for future work.
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